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Abstract
Browsers and their users can be tracked even in the absence of a
persistent IP address or cookie. Unique and hence identifying pieces
of information, making up what is known as a fingerprint, can be col-
lected from browsers by a visited website, e.g. using JavaScript. How-
ever, browsers vary in precisely what information they make available,
and hence their fingerprintability may also vary. In this paper, we
report on the results of experiments examining the fingerprintable at-
tributes made available by a range of modern browsers. We tested
the most widely used browsers for both desktop and mobile platforms.
The results reveal significant differences between browsers in terms of
their fingerprinting potential, meaning that the choice of browser has
significant privacy implications.
1 Introduction
Browser fingerprinting is a technique that can be used by a web server
to uniquely identify a platform; it involves examining information provided
by the browser, e.g. to website-originated JavaScript. The notion of browser
fingerprinting was first discussed by Eckersley [5]. Since Eckersley’s seminal
work, the range and richness of fingerprinting information retrievable from
a browser has substantially increased [10]. Of course, web cookies and/or
the client IP address can be used for the same purposes, but browser finger-
printing is designed to enable browser identification even if cookies are not
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available and the IP address is obfuscated, e.g. through the use of anonymis-
ing proxies.
This paper is intended to help understand whether, and to what degree,
widely-used browsers vary in the quantity and quality of the fingerprint-
ing attributes they make available. This would enable us to learn their
relative fingerprintability. We describe a series of systematic tests per-
formed on currently available browsers, which show that some browsers re-
veal substantially more fingerprinting information than others; hence users
of the least privacy-respecting browsers can be more readily be identified
and/or tracked. We performed the tests using a specially established website
https://fingerprintable.org1. This website does not retain any data re-
covered from visiting browsers, but simply displays the information that it
is able to collect from the currently employed browser. We hope that this
site will be a useful tool in promoting general understanding of the privacy
threat arising from browser fingerprinting, and more generally from some of
the features provided by today’s browsers when executing JavaScript.
Over the last five or six years, a number of authors have performed de-
tailed studies of the effectiveness of a range of browser fingerprinting tech-
niques (e.g. [2, 5, 7, 11, 13, 14]). In this paper, we use a selection of known
fingerprinting approaches to compare the fingerprintability of widely used
web browsers on both desktop and mobile platforms. Since desktop browsers
differ significantly from their mobile counterparts in their capabilities and
features (e.g. plugins cannot be installed on mobile browsers), we made par-
allel studies for these two platform types.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We start in section
2 with the methodology used in our experiments. In section 3 we discuss
the experimental results, followed by an analysis in section 4. In sections
5 and 6 we discuss methods to maintain privacy while browsing and give
concluding remarks.
2 Methodology
We performed our experiments on five of the latest and most widely
used platform types. Specifically, we chose to examine browsers running on
Windows 10 and Mac OS X 10.12 (Sierra) for desktop platforms, and An-
droid 7.0 (Nugget), iOS 10.2.1 and Windows 10 Mobile for mobile devices.
Further details of the methodology we employed to examine browser fin-
gerprintability, including the set of browsers we examined, are given below.
Precise details of the versions of operating systems and browsers used are
given in Appendix B.
1All the scripts used in our experiments are publicly available — see Appendix A.
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2.1 Browsers
As noted above, given the major functional differences between desktop
and mobile browsers, we made parallel studies of the two classes. For both
mobile and desktop platforms, we chose to examine the five most widely
used browsers according to netmarketshare.com2.
• The desktop browsers we examined were Chrome, Internet Ex-
plorer, Firefox, Edge and Safari.
• The mobile browsers used in our tests were Chrome, Safari, Opera
Mini, Firefox and Edge. We excluded Mobile Internet Explorer
and Android Browser because they are no longer being developed or
included with new devices. Specifically, Google has replaced its native
Android browser with Chrome, and Microsoft has replaced Internet
Explorer with Edge in Windows 10 Mobile.
2.2 Installation Options
The use of add-ons and plugins can both increase and decrease the infor-
mation available for fingerprinting. The presence of add-ons inherently in-
creases fingerprinting capabilities, since the set of add-ons (information that
is typically available to executing JavaScript) helps individualise a browser;
in addition, some add-ons reveal information that can identify the user or
browser [8]. On the other hand, specially designed anonymizing add-ons can
be used to conceal a browser’s fingerprint [8]. To avoid biasing the results, in
our tests we used clean installations of browsers so that they did not include
any add-ons or plugins other than those installed and enabled by default.
We could have chosen to disable even those add-ons that are present and
enabled by default, but we chose to leave them on the basis that many users
will not change the browser default settings; hence testing the browser “out
of the box” gives the fairest assessment of its privacy properties.
In fact, the browsers we examined come with very few installed and
enabled add-ons; Edge and Internet Explorer are the only browsers we tested
that come with the Flash plugin installed and enabled by default. Although
Chrome comes with the Flash plugin installed, it is disabled.
The mobile browsers require various permissions to be set as part of
their installation. In addition, browsers may request extra permissions while
executing, depending on the features of a visited website (e.g. to request
permission to take pictures and record video). For testing purposes, we did
not grant any permissions other than those needed for browser installation.
2https://www.netmarketshare.com/browser-market-share.aspx [accessed on
03/03/2017]
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Figure 1: The Fingerprintability page
2.3 Experimental Scripts
To test the fingerprintability of the selected browsers, a web page con-
taining JavaScript was constructed, intended to be served by our experi-
mental website (https://fingerprintable.org). Whenever the website is
visited by a client browser, e.g. one of those being tested, the scripts in the
web page interrogate the browser to learn the values of a set of identifying
attributes (as discussed in section 2.4). Technical details of the scripts are
provided in Appendix A. The scripts used in the experiments were largely
based on those available in the GitHub open repositories.
The web page displayed by the browser contains a summary of the finger-
printing information gathered by the script, and thereby provides an instant
summary of the privacy properties of the browser. As mentioned elsewhere,
this site is publicly available, and is open for general use. A partial screen-
shot of a typically displayed page is shown in Figure 1.
The total size of the script used is approximately 70kB; in informal tests
it loaded and displayed the results without any noticeable delay.
2.4 Attributes
The original goal of our experiments was to sample all the attributes that
can be collected from a web browser. Any attribute that is not fixed for all
browsers has potential value for fingerprinting. However, a large number of
attributes have Boolean values (e.g. Java installed?) or one of a very limited
set of values (e.g. Java version) and hence they typically give relatively little
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identifying information. Given the significant number of such attributes, we
therefore omitted such attributes from our tests, and focused on those that
have the potential to give significantly more information.
We also omitted attributes that, according to Laperdrix et al. [10], take
more than a few seconds to collect (e.g. font metrics [7]), or are unreliable
for fingerprinting purposes (e.g. battery level [14]). Additionally, we omitted
attributes that are made available by all tested browsers as part of their
typical functionality (e.g. screen resolution). It is worth noting that some
attributes are related to the user’s machine and thus can be used to help
identify a specific platform even if a user subsequently switches browsers [4].
Others are browser-specific, and hence can only be used for fingerprinting
as long as the same browser is used.
We next discuss in detail the six fingerprinting attributes used in our
tests.
2.4.1 Fonts through Flash
If the Adobe Flash plugin is installed and enabled, it can be used to reveal
the set, and installation order, of fonts installed on the user platform; this is
known to be a highly discriminating attribute (see, for example, Eckersley
[5]). Moreover, this attribute can be used to fingerprint a platform even if
multiple browsers are used. However, of the desktop browsers we examined,
only Edge and Internet Explorer have Flash installed and enabled by default.
In this respect, Edge is therefore significantly less privacy-protecting than
its competitors, since learning the set of installed fonts without using Flash
is non-trivial.
None of the mobile browsers we examined support Flash, so the set of
installed fonts is not used when comparing the fingerprintability of this class
of browsers. Furthermore, the most widely used mobile OSs (i.e. Android
and iOS) do not give the user the option to install fonts.
There is another, albeit less accurate, method of discovering the set of
installed fonts using website-supplied JavaScript [13]. However, we do not
consider it as part of our comparison since it works in the same way for all
the tested browsers.
2.4.2 Device ID(s)
A device ID3 is a hash value generated by a browser by applying a cryp-
tographic hash function to the unique ID of a hardware component in the
user platform (combined with other data values); it is retrieved by requesting
the WebRTC hardware ID attribute. WebRTC4 is a set of communications
3 https://browserleaks.com/webrtc#webrtc-device-id [accessed on 03/03/2017]
4 https://webrtc.org [accessed on 03/03/2017]
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protocols and APIs that provides browsers and mobile applications with
Real-Time Communications (RTC) capabilities via simple APIs.
The main intended application of such device IDs would appear to re-
late to managing multimedia content, and the platform components whose
identifiers are used are typically the loudspeaker, microphone and/or cam-
era. Since the device ID is computed on other data in addition to a unique
hardware identifier, the value computed by a browser will typically change
when accessed by different websites. However, for a single website, the de-
vice ID appears likely to remain constant (at least for some browsers) across
multiple visits, giving it high value for fingerprinting purposes. Moreover, a
device ID seems to be constant when queried in different ways; for example,
we obtained the value via an iframe on a different website, and it gave the
same value as that for the framed site.
To the authors’ knowledge, the use of this attribute for browser fin-
gerprinting has not previously been discussed, and so its robustness and
usefulness for this purpose has yet to be determined. However, experiments
conducted as part of this research show that it has great promise for use
in fingerprinting. Nonetheless, further study is needed to investigate this
in greater detail. Gaining a better understanding of how exactly the de-
vice ID is computed by the various browsers would certainly help in such
an investigation, although such information does not appear to be publicly
available.
2.4.3 Canvas Image
The Canvas API is a recently introduced HTML5 API that allows web-
sites to render an image for display by the user browser, an alternative to
the commonly used technique of downloading an image file from the server
[9]. Several studies [1, 10, 11] have demonstrated the possibility of uniquely
fingerprinting browsers and their host platforms based on subtle differences
in how an image is rendered by the browser. We based our tests on the par-
ticularly effective Canvas image fingerprinting approach due to Englehardt
and Narayanan [6].
The Canvas API allows the server to request the return of certain de-
tails of a rendered image (e.g. the RGBA5 values of rendered image pixels)
[11]. Since each browser appears to have its own rendering algorithm, the
returned image will vary depending on the browser as well as the computing
environment [11]. A simple means of using this fact for fingerprinting is to
hash the returned image details and use this hash value as an attribute. All
the tested browsers rendered the sample Canvas image provided by the test
script (see figure 2), and as a result give a fingerprint for that browser. Al-
though not part of our comparative experiments, it is interesting to observe
5red green blue alpha (opacity)
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Figure 2: Sample Canvas image used in our tests
that the Tor browser (a modified version of Firefox that uses the Tor net-
work) displays a warning and asks the user for permission before rendering
a Canvas image. However, none of the tested browsers made such a request.
Not only does this attribute enable fingerprinting based on the browser
in use, but in some cases it provides the ability to discriminate between
two similar platforms running the same browser. That is, in some cases the
image rendered by the same browser will differ given a small change in the
computing environment.
2.4.4 WebGL Renderer
Some browsers provide access to the identity of the vendor and the spe-
cific model of the user platform’s Graphics Processing Unit (GPU). These
two pieces of information are obtained by requesting the following We-
bGL attributes: UNMASKED VENDOR WEBGL and UNMASKED REN-
DERER WEBGL. These attributes could reveal the Central Processing Unit
(CPU) type if there is no GPU or if the GPU is not used by the browser.
We found that the UNMASKED VENDOR WEBGL either states the
browser vendor or the CPU/GPU vendor. In both cases it does not pro-
vide any useful information that cannot be readily found from the UN-
MASKED RENDERER WEBGL (i.e. identifying a vendor is trivial once
the full CPU/GPU model details are known) or the user agent header (see
2.4.5) which reveals the browser vendor. We shall therefore focus solely on
the WebGL renderer.
2.4.5 User Agent
This attribute consists of a data string included in the header of HTTP
response packets that gives information related to the browser, including
its type and version [10] (e.g. Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64;
rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0 ). It is useful in enabling websites to
tailor content to meet the needs of differing browsing platforms. Whilst a
rich source of fingerprinting information, all desktop browsers provide much
the same level of detail, and so this attribute is not useful in comparing their
fingerprintability; we therefore do not use this attribute when comparing
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desktop browsers. However, it remains useful for comparing the fingerprint-
ability of mobile browsers, since in some browsers it includes an indication
of the model of the mobile phone.
2.4.6 Private IP Address(s)
The local IP address of a user platform can be discovered if the executing
JavaScript is able to ping a STUN server6. This possibility was apparently
first observed by Roesler7. This fingerprinting technique works for browsers
that support WebRTC [6]. Potentially, the revealed IP address(es) could
include the client’s local IPv4 address as well as one, or more, of the client’s
unique local addresses (ULAs)8 thus making it more fingerprintable.
Ideally, a website cannot discover the real public IP address of a user
platform that is employing a VPN. However, as discussed by Perta et al.
[15], a website can learn the public IP address as well as the IP address
assigned by NAT or VPN of a visiting browser by exploiting a feature of its
WebRTC implementation [3]. However, it was previously reported [15] that
an IP address leak does not occur in all VPN implementations.
2.5 Performing the Experiments
Platforms of the specified types, running the chosen operating systems,
were equipped with the relevant browsers (clean installs, as discussed above).
The browser was then made to visit the test website (https://fingerprintable.
org) and the data generated by the script was collected and recorded. The
10 datasets (five for the desktop platform and five for the mobile platform)
generated were then processed and used to derive the information given in
section 3 below.
2.5.1 Attribute Processing
Each browser was tested for the retrievability of discriminating infor-
mation for each of the six fingerprinting attributes described in section 2.4.
For most attributes, it was straightforward to determine whether or not the
browser returned any fingerprintable values. However, some attributes re-
quired some processing to be useful. For example, an attribute such as User
Agent always returns a string of information. The key difference between
one browser and another was whether it included information specific to the
system hosting it. These differences were observed and noted.
6 A STUN server (i.e. a Session Traversal of User Datagram Protocol Through Network
Address Translators (NATs) server) allows a NAT client to set up interactive communi-
cations such as a phone call to a VoIP provider hosted outside the local network.
7https://diafygi.github.io/webrtc-ips/
8The ULA is the approximate IPv6 counterpart of the IPv4 private address; see https:
//tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4193 [accessed 03/03/2017]
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The device ID was tested for both its existence as well as its persistence.
We observed that the browsers that calculate such a value, at some point
calculate a new value. The main difference between browsers in this respect
is in the nature of the trigger that causes recalculation. This means that
some browsers have a more persistent device ID, i.e. one that is more valuable
for fingerprinting, than others.
The Canvas image typically returns the same hash value when tested
on identical platforms. Some browsers also give the same hash value when
running on two devices that have relatively similar specifications. Such
rendering makes the attribute less useful for fingerprinting. To find these
cases we tested and compared Canvas rendered images of each browser on
two devices with similar hardware (for device specifications see Appendix
C).
2.5.2 Fingerprintability Index
For comparison purposes, we rank each attribute as having a high (3),
medium (2) or low (1) Fingerprintability Index (FI), where higher FI indi-
cates an attribute giving more information useful for fingerprinting. These
assignments are based on previous work as well as our own qualitative esti-
mations. We have refrained from using the term entropy or precise entropy
values taken from the prior art, as values are not available for all the at-
tributes we consider in our study. It is important to note that, regardless of
the ranking of attributes, all attributes in our study provide relatively high
entropies, as explained earlier in the paper.
The fonts attribute is ranked as high as it is a highly discriminating
piece of information [5]. Device IDs also have the potential of being highly
discriminating; however, as discussed earlier, browsers that provide device
IDs differ in terms of the persistence of the values. This attribute is therefore
assigned high if the browser shows no signs of changing this value under
typical browser usage, and is assigned medium if a browser provides a new
value with every browsing session. It is assigned low if a browser provides a
new value with every visit or page refresh.
We rank the Canvas API attribute as medium, based on the analysis of
Laperdrix et al. [10]. However, we as rank it as low for any browser that
returns the same image hash value on two devices with similar specifications.
The WebGL information is ranked as low, as Alaca et al. [3] argue that
it provides relatively little information useful for fingerprinting. This is
expected since many devices could be using an identical CPU and/or GPU.
The user agent string reveals a lot of information valuable for fingerprint-
ing [3, 4, 10]. However, we rank it only as medium since we focus here purely
on whether or not it includes information on the mobile phone model. We
assign a rank of low to the leaking of private IP addresses. This is because
most clients are assigned local IPv4 addresses in the 192.168.0.x range [3]
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and such IP addresses tend to be dynamically assigned and so can change
regularly. However, we assign a medium ranking to any browser that reveals
one, or more, of the client’s ULAs in addition to the aforementioned IPv4
address.
3 Results
We next summarise the results of our experiments. We divide the dis-
cussion into two parts, first addressing the tests on desktop platforms and
second the experiments using mobile devices.
3.1 Desktop Browsers
3.1.1 Overview
We summarise below the key observations arising from our examination
of desktop browsers.
• Chrome did not reveal the set of installed fonts through Flash probing
despite the presence of the Flash plugin; this was because the plugin
is disabled by default. Chrome is unique in generating a very discrim-
inating device ID. The value remained the same for at least a month,
and seems unlikely to change until the browser cache is cleared.
Canvas image rendering in Chrome resulted in the same hash on both
test machines. We made the same observation on the mobile version
of Chrome.
When requested for the WebGL attributes, Chrome gave the full de-
tails of the CPU model. The local IPv4 address was also revealed.
• Because Internet Explorer comes with the Flash plugin installed
and enabled by default, it can be used to determine the set of installed
fonts. Internet Explorer does not disclose any device IDs (due to its
lack of WebRTC support). The hash of the image produced using the
Canvas API was the same as that generated by Edge on both test
machines. Internet Explorer revealed the exact model of the CPU.
However, Internet Explorer did not reveal the local IP address.
• Firefox does not include the Flash plugin, and hence it does not reveal
the list of installed fonts through Flash probing. It generated device
IDs, although this attribute is less discriminating than in Chrome as
the device ID changes with every browser session.
Firefox produced two different hashes for the Canvas images on the
two test machines. The WebGL probing simply gave Mozilla for both
the vendor and model of CPU. However, it reveals the local IPv4
address of the user.
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• Safari revealed no information for most of the attributes we tested.
This is mainly because of its lack of full WebRTC support and the
absence of the Flash plugin. However, it does support the Canvas API
and produced the same image hashes on the two test devices. Safari
also revealed the WebGL renderer details.
• Just like Internet Explorer, Edge comes with the Flash plugin installed
and enabled by default. This reveals the set of fonts installed on
the computer, which is highly valuable for fingerprinting. It provides
device IDs but they change every time a website is revisited or even
refreshed. It gave the same Canvas hash value as Internet Explorer on
the test machines. It also revealed the exact GPU model. Moreover,
amongst tested desktop browsers, it was unique in exposing both the
client’s local IPv4 address and ULA.
Table 1: Desktop Browser Fingerprintability
Attribute / Browser Chrome Internet Explorer Firefox Edge Safari
Fonts - high - high -
Device ID high - medium low -
Canvas low low medium low low
WebGL Renderer low - low low -
Local IP low - low medium -
Total attributes 4 2 4 5 1
Fingerprintability Index 6 4 6 8 1
3.1.2 Discussion
The results of our tests are summarised in Table 1. Only Chrome, Fire-
fox, and Edge provided device IDs. The fingerprintability of this attribute
varies significantly between tested browsers. Chrome device IDs are consis-
tent and do not change unless the user selects the privacy mode9 feature or
clears the browser cache. The Firefox device ID remained the same during
multiple visits in a single browsing session, but changed once the browser
was reopened. Of the browsers revealing a device ID, Edge gave the value
that changed most readily; merely refreshing a web page caused Edge to
generate a new value. This makes this attribute in Edge of very limited use
for fingerprinting.
All the tested browsers support the Canvas API and rendered the scripted
image in our test, i.e. they all reveal this fingerprinting attribute. However,
in the case of Firefox, the image resulted in a different hash when rendered
on the two test machines. As a result, the Canvas attribute is more finger-
printable in Firefox than the other tested browsers.
9All tested browsers feature a privacy mode; however, every browser has a different
name for it. In the case of Chrome, it is called incognito.
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With the exception of Safari, all the tested browsers exposed the client’s
local IPv4 address. However, Edge was the only tested browser to also reveal
the client’s ULAs. Overall, Edge was the most fingerprintable (FI: 8) and
Safari the least (FI: 1).
3.2 Mobile Browsers
3.2.1 Overview
Summarised below are the main observations arising from our examina-
tion of mobile browsers.
• The Chrome user agent header revealed the specific phone model.
Just like its desktop counterpart, Chrome provided persistent device
IDs. Chrome’s rendering of the Canvas image resulted in the same
hash on both testing devices. It also revealed the vendor and model
of the GPU, and the local IPv4 address.
• Safari mobile did not reveal much information except the fingerprint-
ing information derivable from rendering the Canvas image and the
CPU model in the WebGL attributes.
• The Opera Mini user agent string revealed the phone model. It
provided device IDs that were similar to Firefox in terms of calculating
a new value with every new browsing session. Moreover, it revealed
the GPU model as well as the local IPv4 address.
• Firefox did not reveal the phone model in the user agent header, which
makes this attribute significantly less revealing. However, Firefox did
provide device IDs. It also rendered unique Canvas images on tested
devices and allowed the retrieval of the local IPv4 address of the user.
• The Edge user agent string included the model of the phone. Edge
provided device IDs but, like its desktop counterpart, the IDs change
with every page refresh or revisit. It also revealed the model of the
GPU. The Canvas image rendered was the same on both test de-
vices. Unlike its desktop version, Edge did not expose any private IP
addresses.
3.2.2 Discussion
The results of our tests are summarised in Table 2. Chrome, Opera Mini,
Firefox and Edge included the phone model as part of the user agent string.
They also calculated device IDs.
Although all tested browsers rendered the Canvas image, Chrome, Safari,
and Edge (both desktop and mobile) rendered exactly the same image on
12
Table 2: Mobile Browser Fingerprintability
Attribute / Browser Chrome Safari Opera Mini Firefox Edge
User Agent medium - medium - medium
Device ID high - medium medium low
Canvas low low medium medium low
WebGL Renderer low low low - low
Local IP medium - medium medium -
Total attributes 5 2 5 3 4
Fingerprintability Index 9 2 9 6 5
the test devices with similar specifications. This makes Chrome, Safari and
Edge Canvas images less fingerprintable than the other tested browsers.
Chrome, Opera Mini, and Firefox exposed the local IPv4 addresses.
However, no mobile browser exposed any ULAs. Overall, Chrome and Opera
Mini were the most fingerprintable browsers (FI: 9). Just like its desktop
counterpart, Safari was the least fingerprintable (FI: 2).
3.3 Other Remarks
It seems reasonable to expect that browser fingerprinting based on the
Flash plugin will soon become irrelevant given the imminent disappearance
of Flash [10]. It is important to note that it is not the rendering aspect
of the Canvas API that endangers user privacy but the ability to retrieve
details of the rendered image. If this feature was removed from Canvas
API, it would eliminate any possible fingerprinting based on it, at least
using current methods.
Device IDs have a high potential to endanger user privacy, especially
considering their persistence in Chrome. Moreover, Chrome’s persistent
device IDs seem unnecessary, as evidenced by Edge’s approach of constantly
providing new values.
4 Circumventing Fingerprinting
A number of authors have considered the problem of reducing the degree
to which a browser can be fingerprinted (e.g. [5, 8]). Indeed, a range of tools
exist which are designed to make browsing more anonymous [2, 12]. We,
therefore, do not explore this topic in detail, but simply mention four simple
measures that can be employed to reduce the usefulness of the fingerprinting
attributes we studied in this paper.
• Disable the Canvas APIDespite significant variations in the amount
of information that can be collected depending on the browser, the
Canvas fingerprint is supported by them all. This fingerprint alone
can make any browser highly fingerprintable. Currently, Canvas sup-
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port in the tested browsers can be blocked by specialised add-ons such
as CanvasBlocker10.
• Disable Flash The number of websites that use Adobe Flash is reduc-
ing, and most web browsers are discontinuing support for it [10]. So,
anyone using a desktop browser that has the Flash plugin installed
and enabled may wish to consider disabling it. This will prevent a
website using Flash to discover the installed fonts, and the order in
which they were installed.
• Disable WebRTC This feature is relatively new, and the discovery
of security vulnerabilities, such as those discussed in this paper, is
perhaps to be expected. Disabling WebRTC would prevent a web-
site from easily retrieving a client’s local IP address(es) or public IP
address when using a VPN. Disabling WebRTC is typically possible
through the browser user settings.
• Anonymizing Add-ons There are many anonymizing add-ons avail-
able for browsers (e.g. Privacy Badger11 and NoScript12) that reduce
or disguise a browser fingerprint. These add-ons, and others, have
been tested and discussed in detail by Fiore et al. [8].
5 Conclusions
Our tests have investigated an aspect of browser fingerprinting that has
not previously been explored in literature, namely looking at the differences
between browsers in terms of the amount of information they reveal. Some
mobile browsers seem to unnecessarily give out the specific phone model.
Moreover, WebRTC has introduced several privacy-compromising properties
that need to be revisited. Increasing numbers of browsers support WebRTC,
and so, unless the issues with it are addressed, browser fingerprintability
seems set to increase. Rendering images via the Canvas API provides a very
discriminating fingerprinting attribute, and all tested browsers support it. It
would therefore be highly desirable if all browsers asked for user permission
before rendering a Canvas image, or at least disabled the option that allows
servers to retrieve details of the rendered image.
Users concerned about their traceability via fingerprinting should also
consider selecting their browser with our results in mind. At the time we
performed our experiments, Safari would appear to be the best choice in this
respect on both mobile and desktop platforms. Despite Chrome being the
most widely used browser, it proved to be one of the most fingerprintable.
10https://addons.mozilla.org/en-gb/firefox/addon/canvasblocker
11
https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/privacy-badger/pkehgijcmpdhfbdbbnkijodmdjhbjlgp
12https://addons.mozilla.org/en-gb/firefox/addon/noscript/
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Appendices
A Test Code
The scripts used in our experiments were gathered from the following
websites:
• https://clientjs.org
• https://github.com/spleennooname/GLeye
• https://github.com/muaz-khan/DetectRTC
Some scripts were modified to suit our testing. All the code we used for
testing is available at our website https://fingerprintable.org.
B Browser and OS Versions
Browser OS
Desktop
Chrome 56.0.2924.87 (64-bit) Windows 10.0.14393 Build 14393
Microsoft Internet Explorer 11.576.14393.0 Windows 10.0.14393 Build 14393
Firefox 51.2 (32-bit) Windows 10.0.14393 Build 14393
Microsoft Edge 38.14393.0.0 Windows 10.0.14393 Build 14393
Safari 10.0.3 (12602.4.8) macOS Sierra 10.12.3
Mobile
Chrome 56.0.2924.87 Android 7.0 (Build 39.2.A.0.374)
Safari 602.1 iOS 10.2.1(14d27)
Opera Mini 22.0.2254.113472 Android 7.0 (Build 39.2.A.0.374)
Firefox 51.0.3 Android 7.0 (Build 39.2.A.0.374)
Microsoft Edge 38.14393.693.0 Windows 10 Mobile (OS Build: 10.0.14393.693)
C Specifications of Devices Used for Experiments
OS CPU GPU RAM
Desktop
Windows Intel Core i7-4720HQ 2.6GHz NVIDIA GeForce GTX 960M 16.0 GB
Windows Intel Core i5-5200U 2.2GHz Intel HD Graphics 5500 12.0 GB
macOS Intel Core i5 2.7GHz Intel Iris Graphics 6100 8.0 GB
macOS Intel Core i7 2.7GHz Intel HD Graphics 530 16.0 GB
Mobile
Android Qualcomm Snapdragon 820 64-bit Adreno 530 3.0 GB
Android Qualcomm Snapdragon 801 2.5GHz Adreno 330 3.0 GB
iOS A8 chip 64-bit PowerVR GX6450 1.0 GB
iOS A9 chip 64-bit PowerVR GT7600 2.0 GB
Windows Qualcomm Snapdragon 400 1.2GHz Adreno 305 1.0 GB
Windows Qualcomm Snapdragon 200 1.2GHz Adreno 302 1.0 GB
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